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ABSTRACT (149 words) 
Prenatal exposure to sex hormones exerts organizational effects on the brain which have 
observable behavioral correlates in adult life. There are reasons to expect that social 
behaviors—fundamental for the evolutionary success of humans—might be related to 
biological factors such as prenatal sex hormone exposure. Nevertheless, the existing 
literature is inconclusive as to whether and how prenatal exposure to testosterone and 
estrogen, proxied by the second-to-fourth digit ratio (2D:4D), may predict non-selfish 
behavior. Here, we investigate this question using economic experiments with real 
monetary stakes and analyze five different dimensions of social behavior in a 
comparatively large sample of Caucasian participants (n=560). For both males and 
females, our results show no robust association between right- or left-hand 2D:4D and 
generosity, bargaining, or trust-related behaviors. Moreover, no differences in behavior 
were found according to sex. We conclude that there is no direct correlation between 
2D:4D and these social behaviors. 
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Humans display various social behaviors, such as generosity, fairness, trust, and 
reciprocity, each with its own social and bio-psychological underpinnings (1-4). 
However, while our species shows distinctive behavioral patterns in the social domain 
compared to other taxa, there exists large individual heterogeneity. For example, some 
people are more generous, trustful, or reciprocal than others. Although we know that 
some of the variation emanates from cultural differences (5-7), considerable 
heterogeneity still emerges within cultural groups. This study analyzes the biological 
roots of individual differences in generosity, bargaining, and trust-related behaviors. 
Indeed, many studies—without relying on any particular biological trait—suggest that 
social behavior is heritable or genetically determined to some extent (8, 9, 2). Similarly, 
different biological and genetic factors at certain times of development might determine 
predispositions toward different social behaviors (11-13). The amount of hormones 
individuals are exposed to during prenatal development could be one such factor (14-
16). Fetal exposure to hormones such as androgens and cortisol is known to exert 
organizational effects on the human body and brain which may influence behavior later 
in life (17-20). Since hormonal levels are strongly influenced by genetics (21, 22), this 
may be a channel for the intergenerational transmission of behavior. 
Concerning social behavior, sex hormones and androgens in particular have attracted 
considerable attention. Numerous studies have examined the behavioral correlates of 
circulating (endogenous or administered) testosterone levels (23-29). We focus on the 
organizational effects of prenatal exposure to testosterone. More specifically, we 
explore the relationship between fetal testosterone exposure and social behavior in 
economic experiments. Previous studies have typically used the second-to-fourth digit 
ratio (2D:4D) as a putative marker of prenatal exposure to testosterone or, more 
precisely, of the relative in utero exposure to testosterone compared to estradiol 
(Lutchmaya et al., 2004). Although direct evidence for the 2D:4D-fetal sex hormones 
link only exists for mice (31), rats (32, 33), and birds (34), there is large indirect 
evidence and the ratio is commonly accepted as a proxy of fetal hormone exposure 
(also) in humans (see 35-36 for evidence and arguments against this interpretation). 
2D:4D is calculated such that lower ratios correspond to higher exposure to testosterone 
and lower exposure to estrogen. Consequently, males tend to display lower 2D:4D 
values than females (37, 38). Many studies, some using large samples, have analyzed 
the association between 2D:4D and diverse aspects of social involvement and 
interactions, including status seeking (39), social network positioning (40), and 
managerial ability (41). 
Regarding the economic games designed to elicit (pro)social preferences, the literature 
is inconclusive as to whether and how 2D:4D predicts subjects’ social behavior. Some 
studies report negative effects (42, 43), whereas others indicate positive effects (44-48) 
on prosocial behaviors such as generosity or cooperation. Null and non-linear (mostly 
quadratic) relationships have also been frequently reported (49-56). Other studies find 
2D:4D-context interactive effects where situational cues change the relationship 
between 2D:4D and social behavior. For example, Van den Berg and Dewitte (46) 
observed that lower 2D:4D increases or decreases rejection rates (i.e., punishment) in 
the Ultimatum Game (UG) depending on whether subjects are in a neutral or sex-related 
context, respectively, whereas Millet and Dewitte (49) detected a negative or positive 
association between 2D:4D and generosity in Dictator Games (DG) depending on 
whether or not participants are primed with aggression cues.  
In sum, the existing evidence provides no specific hypothesis regarding how prenatal 
sex hormone exposure (as proxied by 2D:4D) organizes (pro)social behavior in 
economic games. Note that many of these papers are based on hypothetical decisions 
without monetary consequences. 
Three features of this study distinguish it from previous research. First, we use a large 
sample size consisting of 560 individuals that permits high statistical power. 
Second, we elicit five dimensions of social behavior using three economic games with 
real monetary stakes. Our participants decided as Dictators in a DG (see 53, 57) 
measuring generosity, as both Proposers and Responders in the UG (see 58) measuring 
bargaining and punishment behavior, and as both Trustors and Trustees in the Trust 
Game (TG) (see 59) measuring trust and reciprocity (see Methods). Previous studies 
suggest there might be sex differences: women are more generous (57), males trust 
more, but women are more trustworthy (60). Evidence on sex differences in bargaining 
and punishment is mixed and there is some indication that the counterpart’s sex might 
play a role in UG behavior (61, 62). Thus, sexually dimorphic (biological) traits such as 
prenatal hormone exposure may potentially predict behavior in these games. 
Finally, our dataset enables controlling for a number of potential confounding factors, 




Participants and protocol 
The experiment was conducted in October 2011 at the EGEO Lab of the University of 
Granada. The sample comprised 560 Caucasian subjects (330 females; age: 
mean±SD=17.97±1.82). Participants were first asked to complete the socio-
demographic and personality characteristics section, including self-reported life 
satisfaction, risk preferences, and social capital. In addition, the survey contained a math 
test with four simple questions. After the survey, the subjects played the economic 
games in random order. Finally, they completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (67). 
These variables are used as controls in the regression analysis. Below, we briefly 
explain the elicitation and structure of our three main variable types. More details about 
the procedures are reported in the SM. 
After completing the tasks, a research assistant scanned both hands of all the 
participants using a high-resolution scanner. The same researcher measured the finger 
lengths twice from the images using Photoshop. The two resulting 2D:4D 
measurements were averaged to obtain a single 2D:4D ratio value for each hand. As 
expected, the left-hand and right-hand 2D:4Ds were positively correlated (r=0.67, 
p<0.001 for males; r=0.71, p<0.001 for females; Pearson correlation) and males 
displayed lower 2D:4D than females (right-hand means±SD: 2D:4DM=0.960±0.033, 
2D:4DF=0.972±0.033, p<0.001; left-hand means: 2D:4DM=0.965±0.032, 
2D:4DF=0.976±0.032, p<0.001; t-test; see SM). 
Social behavior measurement: Economic games 
Our experiment consisted of three canonical two-person games: the DG, UG, and TG. 
As is standard in economic lab experiments, participants made their decisions 
individually on their computers and never learnt the identity of the person they were 
(randomly) matched with.  
In the DG, the Dictator had to divide €20 between herself and another anonymous 
participant, the Receiver, who had to accept the offer. The amount donated to the other 
participant (DG offer) was our measure of generosity. 
In the UG (58; see Figure SM1), the Proposer proposed a division of €20 between 
herself and another anonymous participant, the Responder, who—unlike the DG—could 
either accept or reject the proposal. If the Responder accepted, the proposed division 
was implemented; in case of rejection, neither participant earned anything. Each subject 
participated in both roles. The offer made to the Responder was our measure of the 
Proposers’ bargaining behavior. For the role of Responder, we used the minimum 
acceptable offer (mao), typically interpreted as indicative of the Responder’s 
willingness to punish (unfair) Proposers at a personal cost (1, 5, 68, 23, 69).  
We employed a binary version of TG (70). Player 1, the Trustor, had to decide whether 
to give the Trustee €10 or €0. If she gave €0, the Trustor earned €10 and the Trustee 
nothing; if she gave €10, the Trustee received 4×€10=€40. In this case, the Trustee had 
to decide whether to return €22 and keep €18 for herself (that is, be trustworthy) or keep 
all €40 without returning anything. The Trustor’s decision thus measures trust, whereas 
the Trustee’s decision measures reciprocity (see Figure SM1). 
Decisions were not hypothetical. Participants’ payoffs were computed according to their 
decisions in the games and those of a randomly matched participant. One of every ten 
participants was randomly selected for payment, and the final payoff was determined by 
a randomly selected role (from the six possible roles, including as Receiver in the DG, 
which is passive). Previous studies have shown that this payment method yields reliable 
data in economic experiments (see 71 and 72). The average earnings of those selected 
for payment, including those winning €0 (11.43%), were €10.43. Descriptive statistics 
and bivariate correlations of the game outcomes and variables are shown in Tables SM1 
and SM2.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables SM3–SM7 report the estimates of a series of models in which we regress the 
behavior in a particular role in a particular game on the combinations of 2D:4D, 2D:4D-
squared (to analyze non-linear, quadratic relationships; 52, 66), and a gender dummy 
variable (including interactions). The models were conducted with and without control 
variables and for the left and right hands separately. 
Our analyses give a clear message: 2D:4D is not systematically related to the subjects’ 
behavior in any game. Independently of the outcome variable and model specification, 
in a total of 40 regressions, 2D:4D did not have a single effect at the 5% significance 
level. The few significant effects at the 10% level disappear when including additional 
control variables and/or adjusting for multiple comparisons. Additionally, the gender 
dummy variable is never significant (t-tests and proportion tests comparing males and 
females’ behavior always yield p>0.16; see Table SM2). 
Hence, 2D:4D is not systematically related to behavior in our data and the effects do not 
depend on gender. Since multiple comparison correction only corroborates the null 
findings from Tables SM3–SM7, they are not reported. 
 
We also performed a factor analysis as a robustness check to exclude the possibility of 
measurement errors distorting our estimates (56, 73). As in previous studies (74, 56), 
our analysis supports the existence of an underlying factor common to DG offer, UG 
offer, TG trust, and TG reciprocity, but not UG mao. However, confirmatory latent 
variable analysis using structural equation modeling fails to detect any association 
between 2D:4D and the latent “prosociality” obtained in the eight model specifications 




This article contributes to the literature analyzing the link between prenatal exposure to 
testosterone/estrogen and prosocial behavior in economic games. We investigate this 
question using three canonical two-person games—DG, UG, and TG—with real 
monetary incentives.  
Our experimental setup comprises five different dimensions of social behavior: 
generosity, bargaining, punishment, trust, and reciprocity. It is worth remarking that we 
use a large sample of Caucasian participants (n=560) with enough power to find a small 
effect size (specifically, r=0.12) with 80% power and α=0.05.  
For both males and females, we find no robust association between right/left-hand 
2D:4D and generosity, bargaining, or trust-related behaviors in any of the 40 
regressions. These results are in line with recent evidence in Candelo and Eckel (54) 
and Parslow et al. (55), who analyze DG giving in a sample of 115 African-Americans 
and 330 Swedish women, respectively. In a larger sample using a larger number of 
incentivized decisions, our results corroborate the lack of a direct relationship. We also 
fail to find significant sex differences in social behavior, in contrast to previous research 
(60, 57). It might be that a significant 2D:4D-prosociality relationship is observed in 
samples where there are sex differences, which is not our case. Future work should 
tackle this question.  
How can we reconcile the different findings in the literature on the association between 
2D:4D and (pro)social behavior? It has been argued that—similarly to its circulating 
counterpart (75; 27)—prenatal testosterone can be understood as a marker for social 
status (76). The evidence indeed suggests that the association between 2D:4D and other 
traits is moderated by the context and its relation to status attainment. Low 2D:4D 
(reflecting high testosterone exposure) robustly predicts aggressive or retaliation 
behavior only if status is at stake or aggression is provoked (45, 47), while many 
inconsistencies arise in neutral settings (76, 77). Furthermore, the association is more 
robust using real-life behaviors and outcomes than hypothetical and lab environments 
(78). Similarly, Brañas-Garza et al. (66) reported a correlation between risk-taking and 
2D:4D only if the elicitation of risk attitudes is incentivized—and thus potentially 
relevant for status attainment—but not in a hypothetical task. Millet and Buehler (78) 
provided a direct test of the moderating effect of status-related framing and found strong 
evidence supporting this hypothesis. These examples are in line with the status- or 
dominance-related interpretation of the 2D:4D-behavior linkage (76). According to this 
interpretation, fetal testosterone mainly manifests itself through enhancing the 
sensitivity to its circulating counterpart, supported by the observation that administered 
testosterone only affects low 2D:4D individuals (79, 80; see also 78). The role of 
circulating testosterone in status-related situations is widely documented (23, 24, 28). 
The above discussion might also explain the diverse findings on social behavior: social 
behavior might be affected by contextual variables similarly and not controlling for the 
context might generate omitted-variable issues (76). In our neutral setting without 
priming status, dominance, or competition but in which all tasks are incentivized, 
neither (pro)sociality nor selfishness is ex ante status-enhancing and we may expect—
and find—no systematic relation between 2D:4D and behavior. This is in line with 
recent arguments that 2D:4D might be a biomarker for (prenatal and adult) sex 
hormones solely in challenging situations (81). The UG mao case is worth noting. 
Previous studies suggest that relative standing or status, and not fairness per se, is an 
important concern in UG rejections (82-84). However, other studies have found 
evidence that both “prosocial” and “antisocial” punishers coexist in the UG. High mao 
might then emanate from a desire either to impose fairness or maintain one’s relative 
standing (69), beyond other motives (85). Thus, rejections in the UG may stem from 
multiple motivations. Future research should explore these possibilities. 
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Details on the protocol and analysis and Tables SM1-7 
 
1) Details on the protocol and analysis 
2D:4D measurement 
At the end of each session, both the left and right hands of all the participants were 
scanned using a high-resolution scanner (Canon Slide 90). The lengths of the index and 
ring fingers were measured from the scanned images as the distance from the middle of 
the basal crease to the tip of the finger using Photoshop (see Neyse and Brañas-Garza, 
2014). Computer-assisted measurements of 2D:4D from scanned pictures have been 
found to be more precise and reliable than measurements using other methods (Allaway 
et al., 2009; Kemper and Schwerdtfeger, 2009). The 2D:4D of each hand was measured 
twice at an interval of one month by the same experienced researcher (not involved in 
this paper). These measurements displayed a high repeatability (right hand: intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) = 0.957, p<0.001, left hand: ICC = 0.944, p<0.001) and 
were averaged to obtain a single value of the 2D:4D ratio for each hand. As expected, 
the left-hand and right-hand 2D:4Ds were correlated within individuals (r = 0.67, 
p<0.001 for males; r =0.71, p < 0.001 for females; Pearson correlation) and males 
displayed lower 2D:4D than females (right-hand means [SD]: 2D:4DM =0.960 [0.033], 
2D:4DF =0.972 [0.033], p<0.001; left-hand means: 2D:4DM =0.965 [0.032], 2D:4DF 
=0.976 [0.032], p<0.001; t-test). 
 
 
Social behavior measurement - Economic games 
Our experiment consists of three canonical two-person games: the Dictator Game 
(hereafter ‘DG’), the Ultimatum Game (UG), and the Trust Game (TG). The games 
were faced by each participant in random order and all participants played both roles in 
each game. For each decision, participants would be matched with a different 
anonymous individual selected at random among the other participants.  
In the DG, one player, the Dictator, had to divide €20 between herself and another 
anonymous participant, the Receiver, who could not but accept the offer. In our 
experiment, subjects were only allowed to propose the split in €2 increments. We 
employ the amount of money donated to the other participant (DG offer) as a measure 
of generosity. Although the role of Receiver is passive in the DG, to make sure that 
Dictators’ decisions affect others, the role of Receiver could have been selected for 
payment. That is, participants made five decisions but there existed six different roles 
for payment (and this was carefully explained to the participants). 
In the UG (Güth et al., 1982; see Figure SM1), one player, the Proposer, had to propose 
a division of €20 between herself and another anonymous participant, the Responder, 
who—in contrast to the DG—could either accept or reject the proposal. If the latter 
accepted, the proposed division was implemented; in case of rejection, neither 
participant earned anything. Each subject participated in both roles. The offer made to 
the Responder will be our measure of Proposers’ bargaining behavior. For the role of 
Responder, we used the strategy method: each subject had to state her willingness to 
accept or reject each of the possible proposals without knowing the offer of the 
Proposer. Below, we employ the minimum acceptable offer (hereafter ‘mao’)—the 
minimum amount of money that a subject would accept—as our measure of 
Responders’ behavior. Such approach is common in the literature and the mao is 
typically interpreted as indicative for the Responder’s willingness to punish the (unfair) 
Proposer at a personal cost (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005; 
Brañas-Garza et al., 2006).  
 
Figure SM1. Ultimatum (left) and Trust (right) Games in strategic form 
implemented in our study. The figure shows the payments (in €) associated to each of 
the possible outcomes for the Proposer (Trustor) and Responder (Trustee) in the 
Ultimatum (Trust) Game. The Dictator Game only differs from the Ultimatum Game in 
that the rejection option does not exist in the second stage and the payoffs consequently 
are (20-X,X). 
 
         
 
As for the TG, we employ a binary version of the game (Ermisch et al., 2009; Figure 
SM1) and again resort to the strategy method. More precisely, one player, the Trustor, 
had to decide whether to pass €10 or €0 to the Trustee. If she passed €0, the Trustor 
earned €10 and the Trustee nothing; if she rather passed €10 (i.e., the Trustor trusted the 
Trustee), the latter would receive 4 × €10 = €40. In such a case, the Trustee had to 
decide whether to either send back €22 and keep €18 for herself (that is, being 
trustworthy) or keep all €40 without sending anything back, in which case the Trustor 
would not earn anything. The Trustor’s decision thus measures trust, whereas the 
Trustee’s decision measures positive reciprocity. Figure 1 displays the extensive form 
of the TG implemented. In the analysis below, TG trust=1 if the participant chose to 
pass the money to the Trustee and 0 otherwise. Similarly, TG reciprocity=1 if as a 
Trustee the participant chose to return the money to the Trustor and 0 otherwise. 
 
Additional variables 
As noted before, we administered all participants a survey eliciting a large amount of 
information (including gender, age, household income, math skills, and social capital). 
Besides we also include questions on life satisfaction, cognitive reflection and risk 
attitudes. 
We measured participants’ subjective well-being through the life satisfaction question 
(Zilioli et al., 2015; Espín et al., 2016b): “In a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means 
‘completely unsatisfied’ and 7 means ‘completely satisfied’, in general, how satisfied 
are you with your life?”.  
In addition, we also control for two measures of cognitive functioning. The first one is 
given by the number of correct responses in a simple math skills test (from 0 to 4). The 
second one measures the participants’ tendency to reflect on their first intuition (i.e., 
their cognitive style, intuitive vs. reflective) and is given by the number of correct 
answers (from 0 to 3) in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). Cognitive 
skills and cognitive styles have been previously related to both social behaviors (Burks 
et al. 2009; Corgnet et al., 2015; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2016; Cabrales et al., 2017; Capraro 
et al., 2017) and 2D:4D (Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Bosch-Domènech et al., 
2014; Cueva et al., 2017) and thus represent potential confounding factors. 
Social capital is measured using the so-called “trust question” from the General Social 
Survey and is included to control for the social environment where the participant 
typically interacts in daily life, i.e. whether people around can in general be trusted or 
not (binary variable): “Generally speaking,  would  you  say  that  most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 
Finally, our battery of controls includes three measures for participants’ risk attitudes 
obtained from a series of binary decisions involving (hypothetical) monetary lotteries. 
Risk attitudes may correlate with both social behavior (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; 
Corgnet et al., 2016) and 2D:4D (e.g. Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011; Brañas-Garza 
et al., 2018). 
 
Econometric analysis 
We first run a series of regression models. Our five social behavior measures (DG offer, 
UG offer, UG mao, TG trust, and TG reciprocity) are regressed on 2D:4D and 2D:4D-
squared (2D:4D-sq; to test for non-linear relationships, e.g. Brañas-Garza et al., 2013). 
Additionally, since 2D:4D is sexually dimorphic, the relation between 2D:4D and 
behavioral traits is often gender-specific (e.g Brañas-Garza and Rustichini, 2011), the 
adherence to sharing rules may differ across men and women (Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Espinosa and Kovářík, 2015), and testosterone affects men and women 
asymmetrically (Zethraeus et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2010), we use a dummy 
variable to control for gender and the interaction between gender and either 2D:4D or 
2D:4D-squared. The regressions are conducted both with and without other control 
variables and for both the left- and right-hand 2D:4D. The control variables are order 
effects, age, income, life satisfaction, social capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. 
We use Ordinary Least Squares regressions for DG offer, UG offer, and UG mao, and 
logistic regressions for TG trust and TG reciprocity. 
The analysis was performed using Stata/SE 15.1 (StataCorp). 
  
2) Supplementary Tables 
 
Table SM1. Descriptive statistics of 2D:4D, game outcomes and control variables 
Variables Mean or 
percentage 
SD Min Max 
Right 2D:4D 0.97 0.03 0.87 1.09 
Left 2D:4D 0.97 0.03 0.88 1.07 
Game outcomes     
DG offer 8.26 3.41 0 20 
UG offer 9.56 1.67 0 20 
UG mao 6.00 3.07 0 10 
TG trust (%) 69.29  0 1 
TG reciprocity (%) 79.11  0 1 
Control variables     
Male (%) 41.07  0 1 
Age 17.97 1.82 18 29 
Household income 2.13 0.75 0 4 
Life satisfaction 5.68 1.05 1 7 
Social capital (%) 21.96  0 1 
Math 2.46 0.81 0 4 
Reflect (CRT) 0.72 0.95 0 3 
Risk 1 (%) 9.82  0 1 
Risk 2 (%) 33.04  0 1 
Risk 3 (%) 11.96  0 1 
Sample size 560    
 Note: Percentages of cases ‘=1’ are displayed for binary variables (0/1) 
  
Table SM2. Bivariate relationships between all variables (Pearson, t-test and p-
test) 
 DG off UG offer UG MAO TG trust TG Rec R 2D:4D L 2D:4D 
UG offer 0.28***       
UG mao -0.03 0.09**      
TG trust 1.71* -0.28 -1.79*     
TG reciprocity 5.39*** 1.68* -0.20 3.62***    
Right 2D:4D 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.25 0.18   
Left 2D:4D 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.47 0.49 0.70***  
Male -0.07 0.71 -0.89 1.42 0.87 -4.50*** -4.00*** 
Age 0.02 0.02 -0.03 1.18 0.08 0.06 0.05 
Household income -0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.67 -0.35 0.00 -0.03 
Life satisfaction -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.75 1.88* -0.03 0.01 
Social capital 1.37 1.32 -1.26 1.06 -0.83 0.97 1.74* 
Math -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.15 2.35** -0.02 0.01 
Reflect (CRT) -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.30 1.29 -0.16 -0.13 
Risk 1 1.65 -0.81 0.74 2.43** 0.87 1.31 1.43 
Risk 2 -0.71 -1.70* -0.76 0.74 -1.62 0.54 0.59 
Risk 3 1.48 -1.15 -0.68 2.14** -1.28 0.03 -0.32 








Age 3.18***       
Household income 1.19 -0.11***      
Social capital 3.42*** 2.36** -0.85     
Math 4.45*** 0.03 0.00 1.39    
Life satisfaction 2.67*** -0.15*** 0.11** 2.55** 0.09**   
Reflect (CRT) 4.61*** -0.01 -0.06 0.78 0.19*** 0.02  
Risk 1 2.72*** -0.30 -0.38 1.00 1.04 1.32 1.10 
Risk 2 2.19** -2.51** 1.60 1.82* 2.09** 0.65 0.14 
Risk 3 1.72* -1.18 1.33 1.98** 0.24 2.39** -0.05 
 Risk 1 Risk 2      
Risk 2 4.78***       
Risk 3 1.93* 3.28***      
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed for the relationship between two continuous 
variables; for the relationship between a continuous and a binary variable, we report the t-statistic from 
t-tests (negative sign: 0>1, positive sign: 1>0; see Table SM1); for the relationship between two binary 
variables, we report the z-statistic from proportion tests (negative sign: negative relationship, positive 




Table SM3. DG offer as a function of 2D:4D 
 
RIGHT HAND 



























































Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
LEFT HAND 



























































Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Note: Eight different models are estimated for the 2D:4D of each hand. Models labeled 
with even numbers include the following control variables: order effects, age, income, 
life satisfaction, social capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. Estimates of OLS 
regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table SM4. UG offer as a function of 2D:4D 
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Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 



























































Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Note: Eight different models are estimated for the 2D:4D of each hand. Models labeled 
with even numbers include the following control variables: order effects, age, income, 
life satisfaction, social capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. Estimates of OLS 
regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table SM5. UG MAO as a function of 2D:4D 
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Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 



























































Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Note: Eight different models are estimated for the 2D:4D of each hand. Models labeled 
with even numbers include the following control variables: order effects, age, income, 
life satisfaction, social capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. Estimates of OLS 
regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table SM6. TG trust as a function of 2D:4D 
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Controls no yes no yes no yes no Yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
 
LEFT HAND 



























































Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 560 
Note: Eight different models are estimated for the 2D:4D of each hand. Models labeled 
with even numbers include the following control variables: order effects, age, income, 
life satisfaction, social capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. Estimates of logistic 
regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table SM7. TG reciprocity as a function of 2D:4D 
Note: Eight different models are estimated for the 2D:4D of each hand. Models labeled with even 
numbers include the following control variables: order effects, age, income, life satisfaction, social 
capital, math, reflection, and risk attitudes. Estimates of logistic regressions (p-values). *** p<0.01, ** 
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Controls no yes no yes no yes no yes 
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